Abstract. We give a new presentation of interactive realizability with a more explicit syntax.
Introduction
The Curry-Howard correspondence was originally discovered for intuitionistic proofs. This is not coincidental: the type systems needed to interpret intuitionistic proofs are usually very simple and natural, as in the case of Heyting Arithmetic and System T (see [8] ). While classical proofs can be transformed into intuitionistic ones by means of the doublenegation translation and then translated into typed programs, the existence of a direct correspondence was deemed unlikely until Griffin showed otherwise in [10] .
Starting with Griffin's, other interpretations extending the Curry-Howard correspondence to classical logic have been put forward. Griffin uses a "typed Idealized Scheme" with the control construct call/cc, that allows access to the current continuation. In [13] , Parigot introduces the λµ-calculus, an extension of lambda calculus with an additional kind of variables for subterms. In [11] , Krivine uses lambda calculus with a non-standard semantics, described by an abstract machine that allows the manipulation of "stacks", which can be thought of as execution contexts.
All these different approaches seems to suggest that, in order to interpret classical logic, we need control operators or some syntactical equivalent thereof. This could be generalized in the idea that "impure" computational constructs are needed in order to interpret nonconstructive proofs. Monads are a concept from category theory that has been widely used in computer science. In particular, they can be used to structure functional programs that mimic the effects of impure features.
In [12] , Moggi advocates the use of monads as a framework to describe and study many different "notions of computation" in the context of categorical semantics of programming languages. A different take on the same idea that actually eschews category theory completely is suggested in [15] by Wadler: the definition of monad becomes purely syntactic 1 and is used as a framework to structure functional programs by providing a clean and modular way to include impure features in purely functional languages (one noteworthy example is I/O in Haskell).
The main idea of this work is to use monads as suggested by Wadler in order to structure programs extracted from classical proofs by interactive realizability. Recently introduced by Berardi and de'Liguoro in [4, 5] , interactive realizability is yet another technique for understanding and extracting the computational content in the case of the sub-classical logic HA + EM 1 (Heyting Arithmetic extended by the law of the excluded middle restricted to Σ 0 1 formulas). Interactive realizability combines Coquand's game theoretic semantics for classical arithmetic [7] and Gold's idea of learning in the limit [9] .
A program extracted by means interactive realizability, called interactive realizer, can be thought of as a learning process. It accumulate information in a knowledge state and use this knowledge in order to "decide" the instances of EM 1 used in the proof. Since these instances are in general undecidable, the realizer actually makes an "educated guess" about which side of an EM 1 instance is true by looking at the state. Such guesses can be wrong.
This can become apparent later in the proof, when the guessed side of the EM 1 instance is used to deduce some decidable statement. If this decidable statement turns out to be false, then the guess was wrong and the proof cannot be completed. In this case the realizer cannot produce the evidence required for the final statement and fails. However failure is due to the fact that we made a wrong guess. We can add this information to the state, so that, using this new state, we will be able to guess the EM 1 instance correctly. At this point we discard the computation that occurred after the wrong guess and we resume from there. This time we guess correctly and can proceed until the end or until we fail again because we guessed incorrectly another EM 1 instance.
There are three "impure" parts in the behavior we described: the dependency on the knowledge state, the possibility of failure to produce the intended result and the backtracking after the failure. In this work we use a monadic approach to describe the first two parts which are peculiar to interactive realizability. We do not describe the third part, which is common also to the other interpretations of classical logic. This paper is an account of interactive realizability where interactive realizers are encoded as λ-terms following the monadic approach to structuring functional programs suggested by Wadler. We shall prove that our presentation of interactive realizability is a sound semantics for HA + EM 1 .
In our presentation, interactive realizer are written in a simply typed λ-calculus with products, coproducts and natural numbers with course-of-value recursion, extended with some abstract terms to represent states and exceptions. The peculiar features of interactive realizability, namely the dependency on the knowledge state and the possibility of failure, are explicitly computed by the λ-terms encoding the realizers. Thus the computational behavior of interactive realizers is evident at the syntactic level, without the need for special semantics.
While proving the soundness of HA + EM 1 with respect to our definition of interactive realizability, we observed that the soundness of HA did not require any assumption on the specific monad we chose to structure interactive realizers (while the soundness of EM 1 requires them as expected). Prompted by this observation, we split the presentation in two parts.
The former is an abstract monadic framework for producing realizability notions where the realizers are written in monadic style. We prove that HA is sound with respect to any realizability semantics defined by the framework, for any monad. The latter is an application of this abstract framework to interactive realizability. We define the specific monad we use to structure interactive realizers and show that, by means of this specific monad, we can realize the EM 1 axiom.
This work builds on the presentation of interactive realizability given in [2] by Aschieri and Berardi. The main contributions with respect to [2] is a more precise description of the computational behavior of interactive realizer. This is explained in more detail at the end of the paper.
Monads have first been used to describe interactive realizability by Berardi and de'Liguoro in [6] and [3] , where interactive realizers for PRA + EM 1 are given a monadic categorical semantics following Moggi's approach. While our idea of using monad to describe interactive realizability was inspired by [6] , our work is mostly unrelated: our use of monads follows Wadler's syntactical approach and we employ a different monad that emphasizes different aspects of interactive realizability.
A Simply Typed λ-Calculus for Realizability
In this section we introduce system T ′ , a simply typed λ-calculus variant of Gödel's system T in which we shall write our realizers. System T ′ will be more convenient for our purposes in order to get a more straightforward translation of monads and related concepts from category theory. There are two main differences between our system T ′ and system T . The first one is that we replace the boolean type with the more general sum (or co-product) type. The second one is that the recursion operator uses complete recursion instead of standard primitive recursion.
We begin by defining the types. We shall use the metavariables X, Y and Z for types. We assume that we have a finite set of atomic types that includes the unit type Unit and the type of natural numbers Nat. Moreover we have three type binary type constructors →, ×, +. In other words, for any types X and Y we have the arrow (or function) type X → Y, the product type X × Y and the sum (or co-product) type X + Y.
We can now define the typed terms of the calculus. We assume that we have a countable set of typed term constants that includes the constructors and the destructors for the unit, natural, product and sum types (listed in fig. 1 ) and a countable set of variables of type X for any type X:
We use the metavariables x, y, z for terms. Moreover for any two terms x : X and y : X → Y we have a term yx : Y and for any variable x : X and term y : Y we have a term λx. y : X → Y.
In order to avoid a parenthesis overflow, we shall follow the usual conventions for writing terms and types. For terms this means that application and abstraction are respectively left and right-associative and that abstraction binds as many terms as possible on its right; for types it means that × and + are left-associative and associate more closely than →, which is right-associative. We also omit outer parenthesis. For example: 
where n is a natural number or the symbol ∞. We define the reductions for the terms of system T ′ :
where a :
Note that we use c as a dummy term of type Z 1 . We explain the reduction given for crec, since it is not the standard one. The difference is due to the fact that crec is meant to realize complete induction instead of standard induction. In complete induction, the inductive hypothesis holds not only for the immediate predecessor of the value we are considering, but also for all the smaller values.
Similarly, crec allows us to recursively define a function f where the value of f (m) depends not only on the value of f (m − 1) but also on the value of f (l), for any l < m. Thus, when computing crec 
2 Unlike in standard primitive recursion, where the computation always comprises m steps, in course-of-values primitive recursion the computation can actually be shorter if h "skips" values. guarantees termination. The symbol ∞ acts as a dummy guard, which gets replaced with an effective one when crec Z ∞ h is evaluated the first time. System T ′ shares most of the good properties of Gödel's system T , in particular confluence, strong normalization 3 and a normal form property.
Monadic Realizability
This section contains the abstract part of our work. We describe the abstract framework of monadic realizability and show the soundness of HA with respect to the semantics induced by a generic monad.
We state the properties that a suitable relation must satisfy in order to be called a monadic realizability relation and we show how such a relation induces a (monadic) realizability semantics. Then we describe the proof decoration procedure to extract monadic realizers from proofs in HA. Here we are only concerned with proofs in HA, for a nontrivial example of a monadic realizability notion see interactive realizability in section 4.
We start by introducing a syntactic translation of the concept of monad from category theory. Informally, a monad is an operator T M "extending" a type, with a canonical embedding from X to T M (X), a canonical way to lift a map from X to T M (Y) to a map from T M (X) to T M (Y), a canonical way of merging an element of T M (X) and an element of T M (Y) into an element of T M (X × Y). We also requires some equations relating these canonical maps, equations which are often satisfied in the practice of programming. 
Definition 1 (Syntactic Monad
satisfying the following properties:
The terms unit M and star M and properties M1 and M2 are a straightforward translation of the definition of Kleisli tripe in category theory, an equivalent way to describe a monad 4 .
3 Strong normalization is a consequence of the explicit bound on recursion given by the subscript in the recursion constant. 4 This part of the definition follows the one given by Wadler in [15] , with the difference that we replace the term bind with star M , where:
Defining star M and bind in terms of each other is straightforward:
The term star M corresponds directly to the operator * in the definition of Kleisli triple. Term merge M and property M3 are connected to the definition of strong monad: merge M is the syntactical counterpart of the natural transformation φ, induced by the tensorial strength of the monad (see [12] for details). While φ satisfies several other properties in [12] , property M3 is the only one we need for our treatment.
Example 1.
The simplest example of syntactic monad is the identity monad Id, defined as:
This monad cannot describe any additional computational property besides the value a term reduces to.
A realizability relation is a binary relation between terms and closed formulas. When a term and a formula are in such a relation we shall say that the term realizes the formula or that the term is a realizer of the formula. The intended meaning is that a realizer of a formula is the computational content of a proof of the formula.
We proceed towards the definition of a family of realizability relations, which we call monadic realizability relations. Any monadic realizability relation is given with respect to some monad M and determines a particular notion of realizability where realizers have the computational properties described by the monad. In the rest of this section we shall assume that M = (T M , unit M , star M , merge M ) denotes any fixed syntactic monad.
We now define the type of the monadic realizers of a formula. The idea is to take the standard definition of the type of intuitionistic realizers of a formula A and to apply T M only to the type X of the whole formula A and to the types appearing in X after an arrow, namely the types of consequents C of implication sub-formulas B → C in A and the types of bodies B of universal quantified sub-formulas ∀x. B in A. This is the standard call-by-value way to treat arrow types in a monadic framework explained in [14].
Definition 2 (Types for Monadic Realizers). We define two mappings · M and |·| M from formulas to types by simultaneous recursion. The first is the outer or monadic typing of a formula A:
A M = T M |A| M , and the latter is the inner typing, defined by induction on the structure of A:
where P is an atomic formula and A and B are any formulas.
We consider ⊥ to be atomic and ¬A to be a notation for A → ⊥, so the types of their realizers follow from the previous definition.
As we defined two types for each formula A, each formula has two possible realizers, one of type |A| M and one of type A M . The former will follow the BHK interpretation like an ordinary intuitionistic realizer while the latter will be able to take advantage of the computational properties given by the syntactic monad M. A formula (in particular classical principles) may have a realizer of monadic type but no realizer of inner type.
We shall now state the requirements for a realizability relation to be a monadic realizability relation. A realizability relation is to be thought of as the restriction of the realizability semantics to closed formulas, that is, a relation between terms of T ′ and closed formulas which holds when a term is a realizer of the formula. Since a formula can have realizers of inner and outer type, in the following definition two realizability relations will appear: R M for realizers of inner type, whose definition is modeled after the BHK interpretation and R M for the realizers of outer type, which takes in consideration the computational properties of the monad M.
As a typographical convention we shall use the letters r, p and q for terms of type |A| M . Similarly we shall use r, p and q for terms of type A M .
Definition 3 (Monadic Realizability Relation). Let R M be a realizability relation between terms of type A M and closed formulas A. Let R M be another realizability relation between terms of type |A| M and closed formulas A, such that
• r R M P iff r * and P is true,
where P is a closed atomic formula and B and C are generic formulas. We consider ⊥ a closed atomic formula which is never true (for instance 0 = 1). We shall say that the pair (R M , R M ) is a monadic realizability relation if the following properties are satisfied:
We will say that a term r (resp. r) is an inner (resp. outer or monadic) realizer of a formula A if r : |A| M (resp. r : A M ) and r R M A (resp. r R M A).
When defining a concrete monadic realizability relation, it is often convenient to define R M in terms of R M too, that is, the two relations will be defined by simultaneous recursion in terms of each other.
Note how the properties of the relation R M resemble the clauses the definition of standard modified realizability. The main difference is that in the functional cases, those of implication and universal quantification, R M is not defined in terms of itself but uses R M . This makes apparent our claim that the behavior of inner realizers is closely related to the BHK interpretation.
Property MR1 is a constraint on the relationship between R M and R M . It requires unit M to transform inner realizers into monadic realizers, which can be thought as the fact that realizers satisfying the BHK interpretation are acceptable monadic realizers. Property MR2 again links R M and R M , this time through star M . It says that, if we have a term that maps inner realizers into monadic realizers, its lifting by means of star M maps monadic realizers into monadic realizers. Property MR3 is a compatibility condition between merge M and R M . These conditions are all we shall need in order to show that any monadic realizability relation determines a sound semantics for HA. Later we shall see how particular instances of monadic realizability can produce a sound semantics for more than just HA. We can now define the monadic realizability semantics for a given monadic realizability relation, that is, we say when a realizer validates a sequent where a formula can be open and depend on assumptions. In order to do this we need a notation for a formula in a context, which we call decorated sequent. A decorated sequent has the form Γ M r : A where A is a formula, r is a term of type A M and Γ is the context, namely, a list of assumptions written as α 1 : A 1 , . . . α k : A k where A 1 , . . . , A k are formulas and α 1 , . . . , α k are proof variables that label each assumption, that is, they are variables of type |A 1 | M , . . . , |A k | M . As we did with the syntactic monad M, in the following we shall assume to be working with a fixed generic monadic realizability relation R M .
Definition 4 (Monadic Realizability Semantics). Consider a decorated sequent:
such that the free variables of B are x 1 , . . . , x l and the free variables of r are either in x 1 , . . . , x l or in α 1 , . . . , α k . We say that the sequent is valid if and only if for all natural numbers n 1 , . . . , n l and for all inner realizers p 1 :
we have that
Example 3. From definition 4, it follows that the semantics induced by the monadic realizability relation R Id is exactly the standard semantics of modified realizability.
Now that we have defined our semantics, we can illustrate the method to extract monadic realizers from proofs in HA. Later we shall show how to extend our proof extraction technique to HA + EM 1 . Since proof in HA are constructive, the monadic realizers obtained from them behave much like their counterparts in standard modified realizability and comply with the BHK interpretation. In section 4 we shall show how to extend the proof decoration to non constructive proofs by exhibiting a monadic realizer of EM 1 that truly takes advantage of monadic realizability since it does not act accordingly to the BHK interpretation.
In order to build monadic realizers of proofs in HA we need a generalization of star M that works for functions of more than one argument. We can build it using merge M to pack realizers together. Thus let
be a family of terms defined by induction on k ≥ 0:
For instance:
Moreover we shall need to "raise" the return value of a term f : X 1 → · · · → X k → Y with unit M before we apply star k . We define the family of terms raise k by means of star k , for any k ≥ 0:
Now we can show how to extract a monadic realizer from a proof in HA. Let D be a derivation of some formula A in HA, that is, a derivation ending with Γ ⊢ A. We produce a decorated derivation by replacing each rule instance in D with the suitable instance of the decorated version of the same rule given in fig. 2 . These decorated rules differ from the previous version in that they replace sequents with decorated sequents, that is, they bind a term to each formula, where the term bound to the conclusion of a rule is build from the terms bound to the premises. Thus we have defined a term by structural induction on the derivation: if the conclusion of the decorated derivation is Γ M r : A then we set D * ≡ r. Id
where all formulas in rule Atm are atomic, t is any term and f is defined as follows:
with β not free in r.
In fig. 2 , the rule labeled Atm shows how to decorate any atomic rule of HA. By definition unfolding, we may check that an atomic rule is interpreted as a kind of "merging" of the information associated to each premise. The nature of the merging depends on the monad we choose.
Note how the monadic realizer of each rule is obtained by lifting the suitable term in the corresponding standard modified realizer with star k or raise k . These monadic realizers do not take advantages of particular monadic features (it cannot be otherwise since we have made no assumption on the syntactic monad or the monadic realizability relation). 1 The main difference is that they can act as "glue" between "true" monadic realizers of non constructive axioms and rules, for instance the one we shall build in section 4.
Here we can see that monadic realizability generalizes intuitionistic realizability: decorated rules in fig. 2 reduce to the standard decorated rules for intuitionistic modified realizability in the case of the identity monad Id.
Now we can prove that HA is sound with respect to the monadic realizability semantics given in definition 4. This amounts to say that we can use proof decoration to extract, from any proof in HA, a monadic realizer that makes its conclusion valid. We prove this for a generic monad, which means that the soundness of HA does not depend on the special properties of any specific monad. The proof only needs the simple properties we have requested in definition 3. The proof is long but simple, proceeding by induction on the structure of the decorated version of D.
Theorem 1 entails that any specific monadic realizability notion is a sound semantics for at least HA. Later, when we prove that HA + EM 1 is sound with respect to interactive realizability semantics, we will only need to show that EM 1 is sound since the soundness of HA derives from theorem 1.
Monadic Interactive Realizability
In this section we define interactive realizability as a particular notion of monadic realizability. Thus we show that monadic realizability may realize a sub-classical principle, in this case excluded middle restricted to semi-decidable statements.
In order to describe the computational properties of interactive realizability (see [2] ) we need to define a suitable monad. As we said, interactive realizability is based on the idea of learning by trial and error. We express the idea of trial and error with an exception monad: a term of intended type X has actual type X + Ex, where Ex is the type of exceptions, so that a computation may either return its intended value or an exception. The learning part, which is described by the dependency on a knowledge state, fits with a part of the side-effects monad (see [12] for more details): a term of intended type X has actual type State → X, where State is the type of knowledge states, so that the value of a computation may change with the state. The syntactic monad we are about to define for interactive realizability combines these two monads.
We introduce Ex and State as base types and some term constants satisfying suitable properties. Actually, system T ′ is expressive enough to explicitly define Ex and State and the terms we need, but we prefer a cleaner abstract approach. Therefore, we explain the intended meaning of Ex and State and use it in the following as a guideline.
We write R k for the set of symbols of the k-ary predicates in HA. The intended interpretation of a (knowledge) state s is a partial function s :
that sends a k + 1-ary predicate symbol P and a k-tuple of parameters m 1 , . . . , m k ∈ N to a witness for ∃x. P(m 1 , . . . , m k , x) . We interpret the fact that a state s is undefined for some P, m 1 , . . . , m k as a lack of knowledge about a suitable witness. This is either due to the state being incomplete, meaning that there exists a suitable witness m we could use to extend the state by setting s (P, (m 1 , . . . , m k )) = m, or to the fact that there are no suitable witness, meaning that ∀x. ¬P(m 1 , . . . , m k , x) holds 5 . We require that s satisfies two properties. The first is for s to be sound, meaning that its values are actually witnesses. More precisely:
s (P, (m 1 , . . . , m k )) = m entails P(m 1 , . . . , m k , m) .
The second is that
An exception e : Ex is produced when we instantiate an assumption of the form ∀x. ¬P(m 1 , . . . , m k , x) with some m such that ¬P(m 1 , . . . , m k , m) does not actually hold (remember that we proceed by trial and error, in particular we may assume things that are actually false). This means that m is a witness for ∃x. P(m 1 , . . . , m k , x), in particular it could be used to extend the knowledge state on values where it was previously undefined. The role of exceptions is to encode information about the discovery of new witnesses: since we use this information to extend states the intended interpretation of an exception e is as a partial function:
e : State ⇀ State .
Since e extends states we require that s ≤ e(s). We interpret an exception as a partial function because an exception e may fail to extend some state s. The reason is that e may contain information about a witness m ′ for an existential statement ∃x. P(m 1 , . . . , m k , x) on which s is already defined as m. Note that an existential formula can have more that one witness so two cases may arise: either m = m ′ , meaning that the information of e is already part of s or m m ′ so that the information of e is incompatible with the information of the state. In the first case e(s) = s, while in the second case e(s) is not defined.
Before defining the syntactic monad IR for interactive realizability, we need to introduce some terminology on exceptions and states.
Definition 5 (Terminology on Exceptions and States). We say that a term of type X + Ex is either a regular value a if it reduces to in L a for some term a : X or an exceptional value if it reduces to in R e for some term e : Ex. We say that a term of type State → X is a state function. Finally we say that an exception e properly extends s if e(s) is defined and s < e(s).
Note that different exceptions might be used to extend a knowledge state in incompatible ways, that is, by sending the same predicate symbol and the same tuple of parameters into different witnesses. In order to mediate these conflicts, we introduce the term constant:
The role of the merge function is to put together the information from two exceptions into a single exception. This means that merge cannot simply put together all the information from its argument: if such information contains more that one distinct witness for the same existential statement it must choose one in some arbitrary way, for instance the leftmost or 1 the minimum witness. Many choices for merge are possible, provided that they satisfy the following property: We omit the proof of the fact that IR is a syntactic monad since it is a simple verification.
We now define a family of monadic realizability relations, one for each state s, requiring that a realizer, applied to a knowledge state s, either realizes a formula in the sense of the BHK semantics or can extend s with new knowledge. Interactive realizability aims at producing a realizer of the EM 1 axiom, a weakened form of the excluded middle restricted to Σ 0 1 formulas. A generic instance of EM 1 is written as: (t 1 , . . . , t k , y) ).
Definition 7 (Interactive Realizability Relation
for any k + 1-ary relation P and arithmetic terms t 1 , . . . , t k . We call universal (resp. existential) disjunct the first (resp. the second) disjunct of EM 1 (P, t 1 , . . . , t k ). For more information on EM 1 see [1] .
The main hurdle we have to overcome in order to build a realizer of EM 1 (P, t 1 , . . . , t k ) is that, by the well-known undecidability of the halting problem, there is no total recursive function that can choose which one of the disjuncts holds. Moreover, if the realizer chooses the existential disjunct, it should also be able to provide a witness.
As we said before terms of type State contain knowledge about witnesses of Σ 0 1 formulas. In order to query a state s for a witness n of ∃y. P(n 1 , . . . , n k , y) for some natural numbers n 1 , . . . , n k , we need to extend system T ′ with the family of term constants:
indexed by P ∈ R k+1 (and implicitly by k ≥ 0). The value of query P sn 1 · · · n k should be either * if the s contains no information about such an n or a numeral n such that P (n 1 , . . . , n k , n) is true. More formally we require that query P satisfies the following syntactic property:
for all natural numbers n 1 , . . . , n k . This amounts to require that state do not answer with wrong witnesses and it follows immediately from the intended interpretation if we suitably define query P sn 1 · · · n k using s (P, (n 1 , . . . , n k )). An interactive realizer r P of EM 1 (P) will behave as follows. When it needs to choose one of the disjuncts it queries the state. If the state answer with a witness, r P reduces to a realizer r ∃ of the existential disjunct containing the witness given by the state. Otherwise we can only assume (since we do not know any witness) that the universal disjunct holds and thus r P reduces to a realizer r ∀ of the universal disjunct. This assumption may be wrong if the state is not big enough. When r ∀ is evaluated on numerals (this correspond to the fact that an instance P(n 1 , . . . , n k , n) of the universal disjunct assumption is used in the proof), r ∀ checks whether the instance holds. If this is not the case the realizer made a wrong assumption and r ∀ reduces to an exceptional value, with the effect of halting the regular reduction and returning the exceptional value. For this we need to extend the system T ′ with the last family of terms:
again indexed by P ∈ R k . We shall need eval P to satisfy the following property:
for all natural numbers n 1 , . . . , n k , n. This guarantees that if the universal disjunct instance does not hold eval P reduces to an exceptional value. Thus an interactive realizer which uses a false instance of an universal assumption cannot reduce to a regular value. The last property we need is that for any state s and natural numbers n 1 , . . . , n k ,
in R e entails that e properly extends s.
This condition guarantees that we have no "lazy" realizers that throw exceptions encoding witnesses that are already in the state. ow we can define a realizer for EM 1 (P, t 1 , . . . , t k ) as follows:
(λy Nat . in R (pair y unit IR ))).
Of course we need to check that our definition is correct.
Lemma 2 (Interactive Realizer for EM 1 ).
Given any EM 1 instance EM 1 (P, t 1 , . . . , t k ), the decorated sequent:
is valid with respect to the interactive realizability semantics given in definition 8.
Then we can extend our proof decoration for HA (see fig. 2 ) with the new axiom rule:
and show that interactive realizability realizes the whole HA + EM 1 .
Theorem 2 (Soundness of HA + EM 1 with respect to Interactive Realizability Semantics).
A, where D * is the term obtained by decorating D, is valid with respect to the interactive realizability semantics.
Conclusions
As we mentioned in the introduction, interactive realizability describes a learning by trial-and-error process. In our presentation we focused on the evaluation of interactive realizers, which corresponds to the trial-and-error part and is but a single step in the learning process. For the sake of completeness, we briefly describe the learning process itself.
We can interpret an interactive realizer r of a formula A as a function f from states to states. Recall that the intended interpretation of a term e : Ex is a function that extends states. Then we can define f by means of r as follows:
Note that by definition of R IR we know that in the first case e s properly extends s. We can think of f as a learning function: we start from a knowledge state and try to prove A with r. If we fail, we learn some information that was not present in the state and we use it to extend the state. If we succeed then we do not learn anything and we return the input state. Thus note that the fixed points of f are exactly the states containing enough information to prove A. By composing f with itself we obtain a learning process: we start from some state (for instance the empty one) and we apply f repeatedly. If in this repeated application eventually produces a fixed point, the learning process ends, since we have the required information to prove A. Otherwise we build an infinite sequence of ever increasing knowledge states whose information is never enough to prove A. The fact that the learning process described by interactive realizability ends is proved in Theorem 2.15 of [2] .
In order to express the learning process in system T ′ we would need some sort of fix point operator. However, we do not need control operators or even the continuation monad, since we simulate exceptions by means of the exception monad without really interrupting the evaluation of our realizers. Unfortunately the price for this simplicity is that the learning process is inefficient: each time a realizer reduces to an exceptional value, we start again its evaluation from the beginning, even though the initial part of the evaluation remains the same.
We wish to point out one of the main differences between our presentation of interactive realizability and the one given in [2] . In [2] , the formula-as-types correspondence is closer to the standard one. Exceptions are allowed only at the level of atomic formulas and merge is only used in atomic rules. For instance a realizer for a conjunction A∧ B could normalize to pair e 1 e 2 . In this case, the failure of the realizer is not apparent (at least at the top level) and it is not clear which one of e 1 or e 2 we are supposed to extend the state with. In our version exceptions are allowed at the top level of any formula and they "climb" upwards whenever possible by means of merge. 
Next we define a translation · M that lifts types to their monadic counterparts: 
Expanding the definitions we get :
This is the same translation we described in definition 2.
A slightly longer example of syntactic monad. 
Example 4. A simple but non-trivial example is the exception monad
Moreover raise 2 pair reduces to merge M :
so we could replace it in ∧I.
A.2. Proofs Omitted from Section 3.
Here we collect the proofs that we omitted. In order to prove theorem 1, we need to show that star k and raise k satisfy a generalization of property MR2.
Lemma 3 (Monadic Realizability Property for star k ). Let A 1 , . . . , A k and B be any formulas and let r :
Then, for all terms p 1 :
Proof. By induction on k. For k = 0 it is trivial and for k = 1 it follows from property MR2 since star 1 ≡ star M . Now we just need to prove that if the statement holds for some k ≥ 1, it holds for k + 1 too.
As in the statement we assume that, for all terms p 1 :
and that p 1 :
We need to show that:
Since we know by definition of star k+1 that star k+1 rp 1 · · · p k+1 reduces to the term:
and by property MR3 that merge M p 1 p 2 R M A 1 ∧ A 2 , we see that we can use the inductive hypothesis on k to conclude. In order to do so we have to show that the assumption of the inductive hypothesis holds, namely that, for any p 1 :
(λz
By reducing the realizer we get that this is equivalent to:
which is true by the assumption on r since
We prove a similar property for raise k . 
Lemma 4 (Monadic Realizability Property for raise k
Proof. Assume that, for all terms p 1 :
and let p 1 :
We want to prove that:
By definition of raise k this reduces to:
This follows by lemma 3 if we can show that, for any p 1 :
(λx
Reducing the realizer we get that this is equivalent to:
and this follows by property MR1 and by assumption on r.
Proof of Theorem 1. We proceed by induction on the structure of the decorated version of D, that is, we assume that the statement holds for all decorated sub-derivations of D and we prove that it holds for D too. More precisely we have to check the soundness of each decorated rule, showing that the validity of the premises yields the validity of the conclusion. We start with some general notation and observations. Let Γ ≡ α 1 : A 1 , . . . , α k : A k for some k. Following the notation in definition 4, we fix natural numbers n 1 , . . . , n l and terms r 1 : A 1 , . . . , r k : A k , we define abbreviations:
and we assume that:
. . .
Note that if some term t :
In particular the types of the proof variables in Γ do not change, meaning we do not need to perform substitutions in Γ. We shall take advantage of these facts without mentioning it. Now we can start showing that the rules are sound.
Id We have to prove that:
where A = A i for some i ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
By performing the substitutions, we can rewrite the realizer as raise 0 r i so we need to prove that:
This follows by lemma 4 since by assumption r i R M A i [Ω] . Atm We have to prove that:
By performing the substitutions, we can rewrite the realizer as:
By inductive hypothesis we know that
and thus we can conclude by lemma 4 if we can show that:
for all r 1 , . . . , r l that are inner realizers of P 1 , . . . , P l respectively. Since In the following we will apply the substitutions directly without mentioning it.
∧I We have to prove that 
assuming that: 
assuming by inductive hypothesis that:
We can conclude by lemma 3 if we show that 
for any natural number n. In order to show this we shall prove that for any natural number n and any ω ∈ N ∪ {∞} such that either ω = ∞ or ω > n, we have:
We proceed by complete induction on n, so we assume that the statement holds for all natural numbers m such that m < n. We begin by reducing the realizer (in the first step we use the assumption on ω: This follows from the inductive hypothesis on the premise of the complete induction rule if we can show that:
By definition of R M this is the case if:
for all natural numbers m. By property MR1 this follows from:
Again by definition of R M this is equivalent to showing that for any u : Unit such that u R M m < n we have:
Note that, since u : Unit, u * , so there are two possible cases: either m < n is true and then u R M m <R M n for any u : Unit or m < n is false and no u : Unit can realize m < n. In both cases the statement holds: in the former case by inductive hypothesis on m and in the latter case trivially since the universal quantification on u is empty.
A.3. Proofs Omitted from Section 4. We did not check that definition 6 is correct and that IR actually is a syntactic monad.
Lemma 5 (The Syntactic Monad IR). IR is a syntactic monad.
Proof. We just need to check that unit M , star M and merge M satisfy all the properties in definition 1. This amounts to perform some reductions. A is valid with respect to the monadic realizability semantics induced by R s M for any state s. So we fix a generic state s and proceed by induction on the structure of the decorated version of D, exactly as in theorem 1, that is, we prove that each rule whose premisses are valid has a valid conclusion. Since R s M is a monadic realizability relation, this has already been shown in the proof of theorem 1 for all the rules in HA. We only need to check the EM 1 axiom, but we have already done this in lemma 2.
M1 Given any

